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Metering water consumption has been long advocated by economists in
developing countries as a way to curb waste and prevent resource depletion. However,
very few of these economists have studied the inefficiencies brought about by universal
metering or the conditions under which decentralized water metering decisions are
optimal. If the decision where to install water meters rests on either the consumer or
the Company providing the service this paper shows that if left unregulated, both the
consumer’s and the Company’s decentralized water metering decisions are sub-optimal.
This is because the firm when installing meters, does not take into account the fall in
consumer surplus and the consumer, when voluntarily installing a meter in his dwelling,
does not take into account the effect of his decision on the Company’s profits. To solve
this externality problem and make the decentralized decision optimal, an incentive
mechanism is proposed. The mechanism works through a series of  Pigouvian taxes
imposed by the regulator on the party creating the externality. By means of these
taxes, externalities are internalized and both the consumer and the Company reach the
socially optimal solution in a decentralized way. The implementation of this mechanism
in practice is materialized through a  Coasian property rights approach where the
parties involved reach the efficient solution by bargaining over welfare gains. The party
installing the meter has to buy the “right to meter” from the metered party by fairly
compensating him thus internalizing the externality and reaching the efficient outcome.
To illustrate the incentives involved in metering water consumption, the rate structure
and metering policies of two water concessions in Argentina are studied: Buenos Aires
and Córdoba. Conclusions and policy recommendations are drawn from the theory and
the two practical cases.
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1. Introduction
Pricing a natural resource such as water is no easy task. First it is hard to
establish how much consumers are willing to pay for it. Generally the decision to have
running water and sewerage services is not made by the user but collectively by a
group of users (neighborhood) or mandated by the local government. If this is the case
then it is not generally correct to speak of access demand given a price. Besides, service
disconnection is often not allowed once installed. Second it is hard to determine an
opportunity cost for this resource in case of shortages. This is so because the
opportunity cost of water depends on several factors such as source of extraction (i.e
wells, rivers etc.) the region climate and the resource relative abundance. Finally, water
consumption may involve hard – to  - measure externalities. An excessively low
consumption may endanger population health contributing to the spread of infectious
and parasitic diseases like cholera and diarrhea
1. On the other hand, a high level of
consumption can cause a drop in the level of water reservoirs hampering service
continuity in hot seasons.
When users consume water, they do not consider the effect of this consumption
on future resource availability, nor do they internalize their decision on the
consumption level of others. If water services are not charged based on actual
consumption, the user lacks an incentive to curb consumption and consequently may
incur in waste. In these cases, prices act by signaling the consumer the relative
abundance of this resource. At times of scarcity (drought), the price of the resource
should be higher to ration consumption and reflect the situation of relative shortage.
The price reflecting the resources that must be committed by society for the
production of one additional unit of water is marginal cost. Only in the event that
society is willing to pay the cost of producing and distributing the last cubic meter of
water, must it be produced. What are the defining concepts of marginal cost? Warford
(1997) defines marginal opportunity cost of water as the sum of marginal water
production costs (including extraction, transport, distribution, effluent treatment and
disposal), marginal user costs (opportunity cost of resource depletion) and marginal
environment costs (i.e. positive or negative environmental and health externalities
created by water consumption). The literature on water pricing and costs is vast and it
is not the purpose of this article to review it but a deep study on this subject should
                                                                
1 Alberini et al. (1996) show that a reliable water service (i.e. with a low number of interruptions) matters
more than water quality when trying to prevent diarrheal disease in Jakarta, Indonesia3
include Turvey (1976), IBRD (1977
a,b),  Albouy (1983), OECD (1987), and Elnaboulsi
(2001).
Currently in most Argentine provinces
2 (as in several other countries) water
services are charged  following a rateable value system based on the physical features of
the dwelling like covered area, total area, land price, age of the building etc. This rate
scheme has several problems: Since real consumption is not charged, customers
consume until their willingness to pay is equal to the marginal price (zero) and incur in
waste. It also fails when trying to detect leaks in pipes which leads to overproduction of
water and waste. It also generates a thick weave of cross subsidies among customers
sometimes with no relationship with willingness to pay. Lastly, the rateable fee may be
greater than the utility the consumer gets from the service. Since the rateable fee has
no relationship with actual water consumption and since service disconnection is not
allowed, the user may end up getting a negative net utility level from the service (i.e.
utility from water and sewerage services – rateable monthly fee < 0).
Since this rate structure is so inefficient several provincial and municipal
governments are imposing mandatory universal metering
3. However, universal metering
is expensive and may not even be justified on economic grounds. If the decision to
meter is not the consequence of a careful benefit - cost analysis, metering consumption
may entail a reduction in consumer surplus, an increase in deadweight loss and an
increase in metering costs that may more than offset any reductions in water
production costs. If this is the case, then metering is not a profitable investment and
should not take place
4.
This paper addresses many important issues on the economics of water
metering, namely when to meter, whom to meter, who should bear the cost of metering
and who should decide when and where to meter. The paper proceeds as follows:
Section 2 lays the main argument, this is when to meter. Section 3 deals with the
question of who should be and who should not be metered and more importantly who
should make the decision to meter. This section shows that, if left unregulated, both
the consumer’s and the firm’s water metering decisions are sub-optimal. Section 4
introduces an incentive mechanism whereby decentralized decisions become optimal
and Pareto efficiency is restored. Section 5 presents a Coasian property rights approach
                                                                
2 See IADB (1996) for an analysis of water concessions in Argentina.
3 This is the case of (among others) Córdoba, Mendoza, Corrientes  and Buenos Aires
4 OFWAT (2001) recommends metering only “…when it is cheap or economic to do so...” for example in
houses with gardens or pools. OFWAT does not advocate universal metering (2001, pp.40)4
where both the firm and the user can reach the optimal solution through bargaining.
Lastly, Section 6 illustrates two practical cases of water concessions in Argentina. The
paper concludes in Section 7 by making policy recommendations drawing from the
theory and the two practical cases.
2.Theoretical background
There is a firm that provides water services to a city with N dwellings, each of
which has a water demand function of q w(a) where q is a demand parameter (say, the
number of dwellers or square feet of garden per house) and w(a) £ 1 is the unitary
water demand function (i.e per dweller or per square foot of garden). The Water
Company provides services both on a metered and unmetered basis. For unmetered
water services it collects a fixed rateable monthly fee h per dwelling calculated
following its physical features (i.e. area, covered area, property age etc). For the
metered service, the Company collects a different monthly fee jh (presumably with j
< 1) and a volumetric charge of a [$ / m
3] for water consumption (and eventually
sewage generated and treated too) in excess of a threshold  q w*. If the dwellers
consume less than q w*, they will only be charged the fixed fee jh. If they consume
more than the allowed threshold, they will be charged for consumption in excess of the
threshold, T(a) = j h + q a (max [0, (w(a) - w*)]). Metering cost Cm  is a monthly cost
incurred by the Company on a per dwelling basis that includes meter purchase and
installation, meter reading and maintenance costs.  This cost represents the per dwelling
incremental cost brought about by metering this specific dwelling.
When water consumption is not metered, the marginal water rate faced by the
consumer is zero and demand per dwelling is maximal at q (as 
0 a lim
ﬁ
w(a) ﬁ1). After the
meter is installed and actual consumption charged, demand falls to q w(a) < q. Ca is
the per unit (marginal) water production cost that includes all relevant water costs
discussed in the Introduction and is assumed constant for simplicity.  Figure 1
illustrates the water demand level of a dwelling with consumption parameter q and for
different values of the volumetric charge a.
Before metering, dwellers reach their satiation levels q as marginal consumption
is free. When the meter is installed, dwelling consumption falls to q w(a). The shaded
rectangle in Figure 1 shows pre metering water production costs  q Ca per dwelling.
Before metering the Company may or may not recover these variable costs through the5
fixed rateable charge since this charge has no relationship with actual water
consumption and may well be below or above the true costs of providing the service.
The fixed rateable monthly fee h ˛ , hh Øø ºß  is distributed with density g(h) and
cumulative density G(h). The form of these distribution functions will depend on the
distribution function of the variables underlying the calculation of the rateable fee h
such as covered area of the building, lot size, land price etc. Demand parameter  q
˛ 0,q Øø ºß  is distributed following a conditional density function f(q / h) and cumulative
density function F(q / h). No a priori specific form is assumed for these functions as
they should follow the distribution of, say, the number of inhabitants per house in any
specific city. The analysis is general enough to allow for any specific form of these
distribution functions.  q  is assumed conditional on h because as h increases
(presumably because the house is larger or because it has a garden) average q should
also increase as satiation levels (after the meter has been installed) should be higher. If
the demand parameter q is related to the number of dwellers or to the square feet of
garden, it is reasonable to assume that a larger house (higher h) will have a higher
water demand. The total number of water connections the Company has (both metered
and unmetered) will be given by (1):





















Figure 1: Change in demand with metering6
The monthly payment T(a) collected by the Company is illustrated in Figure 2
for a dwelling with metered monthly consumption q w(a) in excess of the allowed
threshold q w*, rateable monthly charge h before metering and jh after the meter has
been installed (with j presumably less than 1). When dwellers consumed below the
threshold they were charged only the fixed rateable fee h. After the meter has been
installed, dwellers consume at a point where their indifference curve is tangent to the
monthly payment curve (per unit price equal to marginal willingness to pay). They will
pay the Company an amount of money equal to the vertical distance between the
horizontal axis (at q w(a)) and the tangency point.
2.a. The decision to meter consumption
The decision whether or not to install a meter depends on  who makes the
decision. If that decision is left to a regulator with perfect information he / she will
install meters in those dwellings that bring about an increase in marginal welfare. For a
generic dwelling with rateable monthly fee h and demand parameter q (both known by
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Figure 2: Monthly payment T(a) before and after metering
q w*7
After the meter is installed with metering costs borne by the Company and
actual consumption charged beyond the allowed threshold, welfare becomes
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The variation in welfare will be given by
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This is, charging the consumer based on actual consumption will bring about an
increase in welfare (DW > 0), only if water production costs before metering ( q Ca)
were high enough to compensate for the dead weight loss (DWL(a) < 0) created by the
increase in the volumetric charge and metering costs (Cm). Obviously, this condition
will not always hold. For a given volumetric charge a, metering will make sense in
those dwellings where water consumption was high ( q is high), whenever water
production costs C a are high, or when metering costs Cm are low. The cutoff demand
parameter q will be















R C C a w C a dx x w W q          (6)
The term within brackets in (6) has to be positive, which in turn means that for
metering to be welfare enhancing (DW > 0), the increase in the Company’s marginal
profits has to more than offset the fall in consumer surplus and metering costs Cm. The8
higher the qR* in (6) the more positive the equation will be and the greater will be the
welfare gains brought about by metering.
Solving for the cutoff qR*,
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Meters should be installed in all dwellings with q > qR*. In these dwellings, the
increase in the Company’s marginal profits will more than offset the fall in consumer
surplus and metering costs bringing about an increase in welfare. The optimal number
of meters from the regulator’s perspective will be




















Furthermore, if (ex ante) satiation levels fell below or at the minimal threshold
w* it would not make sense to meter. The following Lemma demonstrates this more
formally.
Lemma 1: For dwellings with ex – ante satiation levels  below or at the threshold , q*R
ﬁ ¥ and N
R
m  ﬁ 0, then no meters should be installed.
Proof: Given the existence of the threshold qi w* for each kind of dwelling, there are
four cases to be studied and these are illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows demand
functions for four kinds of dwellings compared to a generic threshold qi w*: q1 that falls
below its threshold, q2  that falls right on the threshold, and q3 and q4  that fall above
it. Since the marginal rate a = 0 below the threshold, type q1 consumers will consume
water until they are satiated at q1. q2 consumers will also reach satiation but right at
their threshold level q2 w*. Type q3  consumers will also consume at the threshold but
they will not reach satiation because to be able to do that they should pay a marginal
water rate a greater than their willingness to pay. Only type q4 consumers will consume
above the threshold because only they can afford the marginal water rate.9
       Figure 3: Consumption below and above the threshold
To prove Lemma 1 we need to analyze case by case.  It is clear that for type q1
consumers, no meters should be installed as consumption would not fall. This type of
consumers will consume at their satiation level because they still face a marginal water
rate equal to zero and w(a) ￿ 1. More formally and with the help of (7) we have that
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Therefore N
R
m  ﬁ 0           Q.E.D
The same result applies to type q2 consumers. These will also reach satiation as
they also face a marginal rate of zero. This result is indicating that universal metering
is incompatible with uncharged consumption thresholds. Dwellings with ex - ante
satiation levels at or below the threshold should not be metered. Put differently, if
regulators want to meter they should never set thresholds above satiation levels.
Type q3  consumers however do reduce their consumption levels when the meter
is installed. Before metering, they satiated themselves at q3 but after metering they cut
consumption down to the threshold  w*q3. This  is  because they cannot afford the
marginal water rate a set by the regulator (a is above their willingness to pay). Since
    q3 q w (a) qi w*
a
a = 0
 a > 0







there is indeed a reduction in consumption, for some of these consumers metering will
make sense. For type q3 consumers the cutoff type looks like the following:
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The optimal number of meters will depend on the ratio of the costs involved
and the threshold level. The higher metering costs, the lower water production costs
and the higher the threshold, the fewer meters should be installed and vice versa. For
type q4  consumers the cutoff type will be exactly the same as in (7).
3. Decentralized metering decisions
Now assume that the regulator sets the thresholds below satiation levels (q w*
< q w (a)) and decides to leave the decision on where to install meters to the Company
or the consumer because he / she lacks complete information. Moreover assume that
the Company and the consumers have full information on demand parameters. It is
easy to show that neither of the decentralized alternatives leads to a socially optimal
solution.
Lemma 2: If left unregulated, both the consumers and the Company will install a sub–
optimal number of meters
Proof: If the Company providing the water service is in charge of deciding where to
install meters, it will do so by choosing to meter those dwellings that will increase its
profits. Therefore, for a dwelling with rateable fixed charge h and a demand parameter
q, the Company’s benefits before metering consumption will be:
q p ) 0 ( a before C h - + =   (11)
After incurring  Cm and charging consumption above the threshold, the
Company’s marginal profits are:
{ } (0)()[0,()] afteraam CwaCmaxwawhC pqj
** =-+--+-    (12)11
The change in Company’s marginal profits,
{ } m a a C h C aw a w C a - - - - - - - = D
* ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) ( j q p     (13)
And the cutoff demand parameter q*F,
{ } 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( * ) ( ) ( 0 = - - - - - - - = = D
*
m a a F C h C aw a w C a j q p                (14)
If j is £ 1, the term within brackets in (14) has to be positive meaning that the
higher the qF*, the higher the Company’s increase in marginal profit and therefore the
more the incentive to meter consumption. Solving for the cutoff qF*,
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For each value of h and for a given marginal rate a, the Company will install
meters in those dwellings with q > q*F . It can be easily seen that for j = 1, qF* < qR*
and the firm’s optimal number of meters NF
m will be larger than the optimal NR
m. That
is, the firm will install more meters than socially optimal
5. The optimal number of
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The Company will install a sub-optimal number of meters, because when
switching to the metered regime, it does not take into account the fall in consumer
surplus caused by the increase in the marginal water rate  a  (an externality). The
Company however, could offer the consumer a reduction in h (through j) that could
offset the fall in consumer surplus and make the consumer voluntarily accept the
change in regime. But the Company has no incentive to do so because lowering h
causes a first order fall in the firm’s revenues and profits.
                                                                
5 See Appendix for a formal proof12
The second part of Lemma 2 is demonstrated as above but in this case for the
consumer. This one will have the Company install a meter in his dwelling and start
paying for actual consumption as long as he experiences an increase in consumer
surplus. Before metering consumer surplus is
h dx x w CSbefore - = ￿
¥
0
) ( q    (17)
After having the meter installed and payed m to the Company for metering
costs, the consumer gets
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The change in consumer surplus and equilibrium condition will be given by
0 ) 1 ( ) (
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The term within brackets in (19) has to be negative and the only way there can
be an increase in consumer surplus will be through a decrease in the fixed charge (j <
1). The reduction in h (through j) should be high enough to offset the term within
brackets and meter charges m. It is also clear from (19) that for those dwellings with q
> q
*
C installing a meter would entail a fall in consumer surplus (equation (19) becomes
more negative). Consumers will therefore voluntarily install meters in those dwellings
with q < q
*
C  as long as there is a reduction in the fixed charge h (j > 0). Otherwise
no voluntary meter take – up will take place. The optimal cutoff q from the consumer’s
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Again, if it is up to the Company to offer a reduction in the fixed charge h to
have some users switch to the metered regime it will not happen. This is because a
reduction in h causes a direct reduction in the Company’s revenues and benefits. The
optimal number of meters from the consumer’s perspective and assuming a reduction in





















) ( ) / (
0
q
q   Q.E.D                     (21)
Here the difference stems from another externality: when choosing where to
meter the consumer does not take into account the fall in water production costs or the
increase in the Company’s marginal profits brought about by the decrease in
consumption (and the increase in the marginal water rate). He only cares about the
impact of the new regime on consumer surplus so he acts accordingly. Here there is a
clear conflict between the Company and the user: for the latter to voluntarily switch to
the metered regime he needs a cut in the monthly fee h but a reduction in h will entail
a first order fall in revenues and profits for the Company. If the decision to set j is left
to the firm, there will be no discounts and no consumers will voluntarily switch.
4. An Incentive Mechanism
So far it was demonstrated that without any kind of intervention by the
regulator the decentralized decisions are sub – optimal. Only by sheer chance can the
three thetas coincide and this is because there are externalities involved in metering
water consumption. How can the decentralized decisions be optimal? The natural
answer to this question would be to make both agents internalize the externalities.
Only in this case would the three solutions coincide.
Lemma 3: Under the incentive mechanism the firm will install the socially optimal
number of meters
Proof: Assume that the regulation establishes that the firm is responsible for choosing
where to meter but at the same time it has to comply with the following demands. It
has to compensate the user for the fall in consumer surplus and it has to pay for
metering costs. Box 1 illustrates the payments involved.14
If the firm proceeds as the regulation establishes then, for a generic dwelling:
q p ) 0 ( a before C h - + =             (22)
After incurring metering costs and compensating the user for the fall in
consumer surplus, the firm gets:
m
a
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The change in the Company’s marginal profits and the equilibrium condition
will be given by
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Again, solving for the cutoff q,
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And the decentralized decision becomes socially optimal. The trick here was to
make the firm internalize the externalities created by the increase in the marginal
Box 1: If the firm chooses where to install a meter then:
i.  The regulator sets  j = 1
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iii. The Company incurs Cm15
water rate a. The regulator set a Pigouvian tax to the firm equal to the externality it
created thus internalizing the cost it imposed on the consumer.
Now, what about the consumer? Is he better off with this incentive mechanism?
It turns out that he is the same off as he was before metering generating a Pareto
optimal allocation of resources. The changes in consumer surplus is calculated now as
h dx x w CSbefore - = ￿
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Under the incentive mechanism the consumer is the same off as before metering
reaching the efficient solution.
Lemma 4: Under the incentive mechanism the user will choose to install a meter in his
dwelling only if it is socially optimal to do so
Proof: Now if it is the consumer who is entitled to choose whether or not to install a
meter, then the regulation should establish the following rules: the firm must reimburse
the consumer with any increases in profits brought about by metering. Also the
consumer should pay for metering costs himself and there should be no discounts in the
monthly fixed charge h.  Box 2 illustrates the side payments involved.16
Consumer surplus before metering will be again
h dx x w CSbefore - = ￿
¥
0
) ( q   (31)
After receiving the payment from the Company and paying for metering costs
through m, the consumer gets
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And assuming that m = Cm  the equilibrium condition is given by
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Solving for the cutoff q,
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And the decentralized decision becomes socially optimal. In addition, the firm
ends up the same off as before metering generating a Pareto increase in welfare. The
firm gets before metering
Box 2: If the consumer chooses where to meter then:
i.  The regulator sets  j = 1
ii.  The user gets a refund of   [ ] { } a w C a w C a a a * ) 0 ( ) ( ) ( - - - - q  from the firm
iii. The user pays for metering costs through m17
q p ) 0 ( a before C h - + =     (35)
And after reimbursing the user with the increase in marginal profits it gets
{ } ()()*()()(0)* afteraaam aCwaawaCwaCawhCm pq =----+-++-+     (36)
(0) aftera hC pq =+-       (37)
0 ) 0 ( ) 0 ( = - + - - - = D h h C C a a q q p      Q.E.D                    (38)
Again, optimality is restored. The mechanism induces both parties to reach the
socially optimal solution in a decentralized way by means of mutual compensations.
5.A Coasian property rights approach: information asymmetries
The key in achieving the optimal solution through a decentralized mechanism
was to make both the firm and the user internalize the externalities that they created.
In theory this is a very simple thing to do as it was demonstrated. The problem arises
when trying to implement this mechanism in practice since the firm has no way of
calculating consumer surplus to then write a check for that amount to the user whose
consumption is about to be metered. Nevertheless, this is a typical externality problem
that can be solved using a Coasian property rights approach. This is because property
rights over charging regimes can be easily assigned to either party and the transaction
costs involved in bargaining are very low. In this scenario there are only two agents
involved: the Company and the user and bargaining between them is relatively easy
and unexpensive.
Suppose that the firm is responsible for deciding where to install meters but
following the rules set by the regulator in Box 1. That is, set j = 1, compensate the
consumer for the fall in consumer surplus and incur metering costs. Suppose
furthermore that the consumer has the right to stay with the rateable value system if
he / she so wishes. That is, no one can make the consumer switch to the metered
regime if he / she does not wish to do so. At the same time however, the user can give18
up that right and switch to the metered regime in exchange for a payment from the
Company. This is, the Company can “bribe” the consumer to make him give up that
right and have him voluntarily abandon the rateable value system to switch to the
metered one
6.
To be able to bargain effectively over welfare gains the firm needs to get as
much information on the consumers / dwellings as it can before installing the meters.
That is, the firm needs to have prior information on demand parameters q’s and on
unitary demand functions w(a). It can be assumed that the firm can gather information
on q’s since these parameters are a function of either the number of dwellers per house
or the number of square meters of garden / construction and this information can be
easily obtained. Furthermore, since the firm charges services following the rateable
value system it already has information on the physical characteristics of all dwellings
and it can also have an accurate idea of the distribution of q. Besides, q’s also represent
satiation levels that the firm can obtain by installing meters in strategic places with the
sole objective of studying dwellers’ demand patterns before making any changes in the
rate regime.
Information on the unitary water demand function w(a) appears as a little more
complicated to find though since meters have not been installed. However, it can
always extrapolate results from other countries or cities with similar rate regimes and
demand patterns. Nevertheless, the best the Company can do is to assume a unitary
demand function  () wa % which can be different from the real one w(a). It will also be
assumed that the Company can know in advance if a particular dwelling’s consumption
level will be below or above the minimum threshold once metered. This is a reasonable
assumption as the Company is assumed to have experience in providing the service.
The rest of the relevant variables are supposed to be known by the Company.
Now if the Water Company wants to install a meter in any given dwelling then,
and by definition, a slightly modified equation (14) has to hold:
{ } ()()*(0)(1)0 Faam aCwaawChC pqj
* D=-------‡ %               (39)
                                                                
6 Gans, King and  Woodbridge (2000) have suggested a similar property rights approach  for
telephone number portability. Applying a property rights approach to water metering is more appropriate
than in number portability though since metering costs are fully per user costs whereas number portability
are mainly fixed costs that have to be sunk before any customers switch companies.19
Then for all dwellings with  q  ‡ qF* the Company will make more money
metering consumption. However, the regulation (Box 1) also imposes the restriction
that j = 1 and that the firm has to “buy the right to meter” from the consumer by
fairly compensating him / her. This compensation will be  T dollars per dwelling.
Therefore, for the firm to be willing to meter consumption condition (40) has to hold:
{ } ()()*(0)0 Faam aCwaawCTC pq
* D=------‡ %                          (40)
How much money would the firm be willing to pay the consumer to make him
switch? Or more importantly, how much money  will the customer demand as a
compensation? Obviously, the user has no incentive to truthfully reveal his consumer
surplus change to the firm, and the firm wants to spend as little money in the process
as possible because every dollar in compensation is a dollar less in profits. The
compensation T will probably have a lower bound given by the increase in the monthly
bill experienced by the consumer. In other words, the consumer will not accept a lower
compensation than the expected increase in his monthly bill, from this value upwards.
On the other hand, the compensation the firm will be willing to pay has also an upper
bound that is given by the value of T that makes (40) bind, otherwise installing a
meter in that dwelling would entail a loss for the Company. Any value between these
two can be an equilibrium in the bargaining game between the Company and the user.
The final outcome will depend on the relative bargaining power and the level of
information of each player.
The bargaining game will probably start with the firm making bids to the
consumer from T = 0 upward until the consumer feels that he has been properly
compensated. When will that be? At any point between the increase in the expected
monthly bill given by
[()*][()*] Bawawhhawaw qq D=-+-=-   (41)
And the maximum compensation Tmax given by (40) binding:
max [()*][1()] FFamam TawawCwaCBCC qq
** =-+--=D+D- %% (42)20
The maximum compensation the Company will be willing to pay is the expected
increase in the consumer’s bill plus expected savings in water production costs (brought
about by the reduction in consumption) minus metering costs. The exact fall in









   (43)
To the extent that the elasticity of water demand is low the fall in consumer
surplus will be similar to the expected increase in the monthly water bill.  If this
assumption is made, any value of compensation T agreed upon between these two
bounds will entail a Pareto increase in welfare. If both the firm and the consumer agree
on the lower bound Tmin = DCS @ DB, the user will be compensated and all the increase











Which is nothing but the optimal metering formula (6) where qF* = qR* and the
firm will choose to install meters in only those dwellings where it is socially optimal to
do so.
If, on the other hand, both the firm and the consumer agree upon the upper
limit for T ( Tmax), all the increase in welfare will accrue to the consumer and the
Company will be indifferent between metering and not metering. Obviously, the
number of meters in this case will be lower than in the previous case because the firm
will not capture the benefits of metering, consumers will. The final outcome (i.e the
value of T agreed upon) will depend on the relative bargaining power and the
information regarding demand parameters that both agents have. If the Company is
relatively more informed about demand and has relatively more bargaining power than
the consumer (as expected), T will be closer to Tmin = DCS @ DB and the firm will
install the socially optimal amount of meters. If, on the other hand, it is the consumer
who has relatively more information on demand and has relatively more bargaining
power (less likely), T will be closer to Tmax and the Company will install fewer meters21
than socially optimal. Again, and in any case, bargaining over welfare gains will result
in a Pareto improvement over the current situation and total water costs (production
+ metering) will be lower than before. The share of welfare that each party captures
will depend on the relative information and bargaining power they have.
Unfortunately, the same property rights approach cannot be used when it is the
consumer who chooses where to meter and the water Company is given the right not to
meter. This is, the consumer may want the firm to meter his consumption but since the
firm has now the right to choose the charging mechanism it wishes, it may refuse to
install the meter. The problem lies in the fact that now the consumer cannot “bribe”
the firm to meter his consumption because to reach the optimal solution it is the firm
that has to pay the consumer the increase in profits according to the policy steps in
Box 2. In other words, the firm would have to give the consumer the increase in profits
brought about by its decision to meter the consumer’s dwelling. If the firm has the
right not to meter then it does not have the incentive to negotiate anything with
anybody and the mechanism breaks down.
The following section illustrates two water concessions in Argentina showing the
perverse incentives involved in their metering policies and rate structures.  These
policies are generally designed by regulators with imperfect information on water
demand patterns creating incentives that lead to over investment and to a socially
inefficient amount of metering reducing aggregate welfare. The incentive mechanism
presented here can be easily implemented with minor changes in the legal status of
these concessions creating a more level playing field for both the Company and the
users.
6. 2 Water Concessions in Argentina: Buenos Aires City and Córdoba
The Company that has the concession in Buenos Aires has three kinds of
customers: residential, non residential and empty lots. There are also two kinds of rate
regimes, metered and unmetered. For non residential customers metering is compulsory
and metering costs are borne by the customer. For residential customers however,
metering is optional and metering costs are borne by the party choosing to meter be it
the Company or the consumer.
Both rate regimes charge a rateable value monthly fee h that is calculated based
on the following physical features of the dwelling: area, covered area, kind of dwelling,
location and land price. Figure 4 shows the rate structure for a residential consumer22
before and after metering. According to the regulations, if the consumer voluntarily
switches to the metered regime he gets a 50% discount on the rateable fee and has a
monthly consumption allowance of 30 m
3 beyond which he starts paying a ($ / m
3) for
water services and another a ($ / m
3) for sewerage. Since either the consumer or the
Company can decide whether to install a meter one can easily see from Figure 4 which
consumers will select the metered regime (and which will not) and which dwellings the
Company will select to meter and which it will not.
Figure  4 : Buenos Aires Concession rate structure for a residential user
     Metered monthly bill  Rateable monthly fee
For each value of h, all dwellings with demand parameters up to  q’’ will
seriously consider installing a meter because their monthly bills (gross of metering
costs) will fall by half for dwellings up to q* and between half and zero in dwellings
between q* and q’’. However, and as demonstrated by Lemma 1, dwellings with thetas
between q = 0 and q* should not be metered as their consumption levels will not fall.
Some consumers between q* and q’’ will also consider switching to metering because
their monthly bills may fall. Therefore for some of these consumers metering may make
sense but only if the consumption and cost fall is large enough to offset metering costs.
The flip side of this is that the Company will see a sharp revenue shortfall for
consumers whose consumption levels fall within the range [0,  q’’  w(a)]. If revenue
stability is guaranteed by the concession contract, the regulator may face a huge
headache in trying to bring revenue back to its pre – metering level with this kind of
rate structure.
T = $ / month
        h
      h / 2
         q*       q’’ w(a)     q’                 q’’’ w(a)     q w(a)
 “Big house”
     high q
“Small house”
 low q23
For all dwellings with q £ q’’ the Company will see a reduction in revenues that
may or may not be offset by the cost reductions caused by the reduction in water
consumption.
The Company will choose to meter those dwellings with q > q’’ because by
doing so it will increase revenues (See Figure 4). Since it also has to incur metering
costs, the Company will see an increase in profits whenever the increase in revenues is
high enough to cover water production and metering costs. This could happen for
example for dwellings with q’’’ in Figure 4. However this is not the socially optimal cut
off q because it does not contemplate the fall in consumer surplus generated by the
increase in the marginal water rate a. q’’’ will be lower and consequently the number of
meters will be higher than the socially optimal.
This rate structure is clearly inefficient as it sends the wrong investment signals.
It induces the users to switch to metering in those dwellings that should not be
metered and induces the Company to install meters without taking into account the
fall in consumer surplus. This rate structure could easily be made efficient by applying
the incentive mechanism. Give the authority to install meters only to the Company,
eliminate discounts on fixed fees and make the company compensate the user.
Figure 5 : Buenos Aires Concession rate structure for a commercial user
           Metered monthly bill                     Rateable monthly fee
For a commercial user though the rate structure does not have a threshold.
They start paying for actual consumption since the very first cubic meter they consume
but they also see their fixed charge h cut in half. Besides, metering is compulsory and
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metering costs are borne by the Company. In this case the Company will not probably
choose to meter those dwellings with q < q’’ (Figure 5) because it will lose revenues.
Metering will occur to the right of q’’ for those dwellings that offset water production
and metering costs. Again, this policy induces and inefficient amount of metering
because it does not take into account the fall in consumer surplus.
The Cordoba Water Concession: Rate structure and metering policy
The rate structure of Cordoba´s Concession Company is slightly different from
that of Buenos Aires in three aspects. On one hand, universal metering is mandatory.
On the other hand, metering costs should be borne by the Company and there are no
reductions in the monthly fixed charge h ( j = 0) for any type of consumer. For
residential consumers there are important allowed consumption thresholds whereas for
commercial customers there are not.
Figure 6 illustrates both the unmetered rateable monthly fee h and the metered
monthly fee (both equal to h) up to the threshold and from that volume on the
variable charge that applies for consumption above the threshold.
Figure 6 : Cordoba Concession rate structure for a residential user
        Metered monthly bill          Rateable monthly fee
First of all and as demonstrated by Lemma 1, universal metering whenever
there are consumption thresholds is senseless. The Company will install meters it
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should never have installed (from q = 0 to q* in Figure 6). These meters will lie idle
and unread and the Company will cut losses by not doing any maintenance or repair on
them. On the other hand the Company will start making money metering those
dwellings where the increase in revenues cover water production and metering costs but
we already know that these meters will be too many from the social point of view.
Notice besides, that under this mechanism no consumer will ever be better off since
there is no reduction in the monthly fee or compensation form the company.
For the commercial user the story is similar but with one slight difference: the
pointless meters will be fewer as there are no allowed consumption thresholds. In sum
the wrong policies with the wrong incentives.
7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Universal metering is seldom socially optimal, and it is sub - optimal whenever
there are uncharged consumption thresholds. Regulators should be warned not to
mandate universal metering unless there is clear evidence that no satiation levels fall
below the minimum consumption threshold.
The optimal policy recommends keeping the current system of rateable monthly
fees (i.e no discounts) which in turn implies that metering costs should be recovered
through the volumetric charge  a.  This is because were metering costs recovered
through any other charge (i.e, a fixed fee like m), the Company should reimburse this
charge to the user as it applies the optimal policy of compensation. Therefore under the
optimal mechanism the Company has no other way of recovering metering costs than
through the volumetric charge a.
The optimal number of meters depends on the volumetric charge a but at the
same time however, a depends on the optimal number of meters, therefore both
variables should be calculated simultaneously in the same optimization problem.
The decentralized decisions are not optimal. Therefore, the Regulator has to
establish some rules. These are illustrated in Boxes 1 and 2 and are based on payments
from the firm to the user to reach the optimal solution. These payments take the form
of Pigouvian Taxes that make the party internalize the externality they create in order
to regain optimality. Metering costs should be borne by the party making the decision
to meter.26
The Coasian property rights approach suggests that the Company should be the
one deciding where to install the meters and the negotiations should involve giving the
user the right to choose the charging regime he pleases. At the same time however, the
user can give up that right in exchange for a payment from the firm. The magnitude of
this compensation will depend on the relative bargaining power and information
regarding demand parameters that both the firm and the consumers have. Since it is
the firm the party with more bargaining power / information, all the welfare gains
brought about by the bargaining game will probably accrue to the firm with the user
being compensated for the fall in consumer surplus thus reaching the optimal solution.
The rate structures of both concessions analyzed in section 6 indicate that
metering policies designed by regulators in developing countries are often misguided
and erroneous. The incentive mechanism presented in this paper can eliminate
inefficiency without the use of discretionary regulation by simply establishing a rule to
then let both parties reach the optimal solution through free negotiation.
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Appendix
For j = 1, the following has to hold:
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Which in turn means that NF
m > NR
m and the firms installs more meters than
socially optimal.
Proof: To prove this result it will suffice to show that * ) (
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